Fighting for an Airborne Polaris: The US Air Force and the Origins of the Skybolt Crisis Revisited

The Soviet launch of Sputnik in October 1957 marked the beginning of a period of significant change for the US Air Force.  Until then, it had held the premier position in terms of the US nuclear deterrent mission relative to the other military services because of Strategic Air Command’s oversight of the US nuclear arsenal. New technologies with new means of delivery, namely the Navy’s sea-launched Polaris missile program that was accelerated in the aftermath of Sputnik, threatened to topple the Air Force from its perch. In 1959, the Air Force initiated the Skybolt missile program to compete with Polaris.  Skybolt was planned as a delivery vehicle that could be launched from a variety of mobile air platforms including Britain’s V-bombers.  Its cancellation, however, precipitated a crisis in Anglo-American relations.
This paper augments the existing narratives of the Skybolt crisis by examining the program from Washington’s perspective during its initial phase of development. The Air Force perspective, the interservice rivalry, and the bureaucratic battles in the US government over the future of the nuclear deterrent in the context of the ill-fated missile program will be discussed, providing crucial new insights into the diplomatic crisis when it eventually unfolded in late1962.